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Abstract 
Executive compensation practices are changing.  Recent corporate compensation 
scandals have caused great public outrage in light of worsening economic conditions.  
Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation has reformed how publicly traded companies compensate 
and report compensation of top executives.  BC Crown Corporations have had to deal 
with even stricter legislation dealing with executive compensation practices.  Publicly 
traded companies need to try harder to comply with the spirit of transparency laws.  BC 
Crown Corporations have capped CEO compensation, but could be in danger of losing 
their top employees to the private sector. 
Keywords:  Executive Compensation, Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms, BC Crown Corporations 
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1: Introduction 
The topic of corporate governance has risen to the fore in recently with the world 
economic crisis sparked by the earnings restatements of many of the largest retail banks 
as they marked down the toxic debts they carried.    When ailing insurer AIG paid out its 
executive bonuses shortly after having received government bailout monies, pundits 
railed against them and public opinion was galvanized against the fat cat CEOs of all 
large companies. (Linn, 2009)   
We have our own homegrown criminal CEOs in Canada, Lord Black was recently 
jailed for his part in a scandal in which he bilked his company, Hollinger International, 
for tens of millions of dollars in unearned compensation.  The arrogant manner in which 
he publicly addressed the issues that lead to his removal from Hollinger and his eventual 
indictment was enough to make him guilty in the court of public opinion long before his 
conviction.  An example of this attitude came in 2003 after he was forced to resign from 
his position as CEO of Hollinger and the company’s stock rose as shortly thereafter.  
Lord Black said:  
“I just made 50-million bucks yesterday.  That’s a flame out I could get used to” 
(Gray, 2003) 
Other American CEOs who took notorious amounts of compensation for doing 
less than satisfactory jobs of managing their companies were also in the news during the 
lead up to the economic crisis.  One of the more notorious of these was Home Depot 
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CEO Robert Nardelli who was forced to resign after the company had underperformed 
under his direction.  At the time of his resignation in 2007, he managed to walk away 
with a severance package totaling $210 million USD.  Shareholders of the company were 
enraged and filed a lawsuit to try to stop him from receiving this money. (Grow, 2007)  
Ironically, Mr. Nardelli was able to get another job almost immediately following this 
scandal and took charge of the Chrysler Company shortly thereafter.  During his time at 
this company, he was unable to turn it around and just two years after he started there, 
Chrysler filed for bankruptcy protection.  The US government had given Chrysler one 
round of bailout money to try to save it from bankruptcy and would have given the 
company a second round of money but for one problem.  The US government put a new 
condition on the second round of bailout money that would force the top 25 executives at 
the company to sign an agreement capping their compensation.  They were unable to get 
the agreement of all 25 of these executives.  Executive compensation may have been the 
final nail in Chrysler’s coffin. (Cho, Whoriskey, & Paley, 2009)   
In British Columbia, we have several crown corporations that are ultimately 
responsible to the taxpayers in the province, and their governance is closely monitored 
not only by government, but by the press besides.  The transparency required of crown 
corporations insures public access to records of executive compensation, and the numbers 
are deemed newsworthy by local papers.  As recently as December 2008, The Vancouver 
Sun Newspaper ran a story about the salaries of public sector employees under the title 
“More than 750 public-sector employees earn $200,000 or more”. (Skelton, 2008)  When 
the salaries of private sector executives in the United States or even Ontario are taken 
into consideration, this may not seem like an outrageous amount, but in BC this is 
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highlighted by Canada Census data that shows family incomes in BC have not risen at the 
same rate as the rest of the country. (Panzenboeck, 2009).  The average family in BC sees 
an annual income of only $62,346, less than one third the amount highlighted in the 
Vancouver Sun headline.  (Panzenboeck, 2009)The Vancouver Sun Article also directs 
readers to a database compiled by the newspaper that lists the salaries 30,000 public 
sector employees. (Skelton, 2008)   
Real scandals have also touched crown corporations in recent years. In 2003, BC 
crown corporation BC Rail was sold to CN, causing the opposition party of the day to 
question payments to one of the players involved.  It was alleged that Patrick Kinsella 
was paid approximately $300,000 over 4 years for helping to sell BC Rail, but that at the 
same time, Kinsella was also connected to CN Rail.  As of April 2009, the matter was 
still under investigation and generating news stories (Hall & Shaw, 2009)  Low ethical 
standards and corrupt management were revealed at ICBC when an investigation into the 
re-selling of vehicles was launched.  The consultants hired to investigate recommended 
the insurance company tighten its policies and procedures.  (Vancouver Sun, 2008)   
The Public Sector Employer’s Council does require a high degree of transparency 
when it comes to the compensation of top executives.  For a comparison of the PSEC 
requirements and the SEC requirements in the US, see table 1: 
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Table 1Comparison of PSEC and SEC Compensation Reporting Regulations 
 PSEC Requirements SEC Requirements 
Whose salary must be 
reported? 
CEO and next four 
highest ranking 
executives when they 
earn more than 
CAD$125,000 base 
salary 
CEO, CFO, and next 
three most highly 
compensated executives 
when they earn more 
than USD$100,000 
In what format should 
this reporting take place? 
Senior employee 
compensation report 
form 
Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis 
including a table of 
salaries and other 
benefits 
In what format must this 
information be made 
available? 
This information must be 
made available on the 
Employer’s website and 
contracts of employment 
must be made available 
during business hours. 
This information must be 
filed with the SEC, which 
makes it available on its 
website. 
(The Public Sector Employers' Council, 2008) (Garfinkle, 2006) 
 How is it possible that these Crown Corporations have managed to keep their 
executive compensation at a reasonable level and yet still get value from their CEOs with 
regard to financial results?  This paper will show that BC Crown Corporations do not 
overpay their CEOs, and that the CEOs of these Crown Corporations deliver value to 
their employers.  We will explore the state of CEO compensation in S&P 500 companies 
in the post Sarbanes Oxley Era and detail the current thinking on Executive 
Compensation best practices.  We will look at the compensation practices and financial 
results of four BC Crown corporations, and compare the largest Crown Corporation with 
a Comparable S&P 500 company.  This will show the value that Crown Corporation 
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CEOs provide to their main stakeholders, the taxpayers and whether or not they are 
actually worth what they are being paid. 
1.1 The problem with powerful CEOs 
Power goes hand in hand with business and money.  Does there have to be 
corruption where there is power?  There does not.  There are checks and balances that can 
be put in place to ensure that a CEO uses the power of the CEO position to benefit the 
company first and the CEO second, but this takes the guidance and will of a strong board.  
In many of the cases of CEOs who were overcompensated for their subpar 
performance, the problems lay in the way their pay was structured.  CEO compensation 
packages have stock options and bonus incentives as well as Supplementary Executive 
Retirement Plans.  These are all areas that can lead to the CEO doing what is best for his 
compensation package rather than serving the long term interests of the company or the 
general interests of the majority of the shareholders.   
In order to overcome this potential conflict of interests between the Principal (the 
company) and the Agent (the CEO), boards form compensation committees that carefully 
review the compensation packages received by executives and board members, and they 
generally hire expert compensation consultants to assist in the design of these packages.  
But how can we guarantee that these committee members and the compensation 
consultants are not also subject to the failings of agency issues or conflicts of interest.  In 
the cases of some companies, the CEO and the Chairman of the Board are one and the 
same.  In cases such as these it means that the CEOs are essentially signing their own 
pay-cheques.  If the other members of the board are also employees of the company or 
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are colleagues of the CEO from other companies upon whose boards the CEO sits, there 
are even more opportunities for abuse of CEO power.  If the compensation committee, 
which is made up of board members, hires a private consultant to provide expertise in the 
area of executive compensation, then that consultant needs to get the approval of the 
board in order to continue the contract.  If the CEO serves as the chairman of the board, 
then the CEO can affect whether or not the consultant is hired again.  In some cases, 
consulting firms may provide more than one service to a company.  In cases such as this, 
there could be pressure from within the consulting firm itself for the compensation 
consultants to come up with a CEO compensation package that is pleasing to the CEO 
rather than one that motivates the CEO to behave in a certain fashion.  
These issues are resolved if the board is independent and the compensation 
consultant used is an outside consultant who is only brought in for this single purpose.  
This is easier said than done.  For a board to be truly independent from the CEO it should 
be nominated by shareholder proxy.  There is the danger that if a board is truly 
independent in this way and the CEO wields less power, that it will leave the company 
open to hostile takeover every time powerful shareholders don’t like the actions of the 
CEO.  This could be detrimental to the long term health of the company if the 
shareholders are of the short term profit taking variety.  In the case of hiring independent 
consultants, this can also be difficult.  If a consulting firm already has vast knowledge of 
the inner workings of a company, its corporate culture, and mission, it is easier for that 
consultant to design compensation packages that are attuned to those needs.  An outside 
company would have a much steeper learning curve in this respect and would have to 
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waste expensive man hours getting to know the company at a sufficiently deep level in 
order to effectively act on its behalf. 
1.2 Keeping the executives on the straight and narrow while still 
keeping them 
If you want a CEO to govern a company properly and make sure to serve the 
interests of the shareholders, then that CEO must be fairly compensated.  In fact, if a 
CEO is not well compensated, there may be more temptation to do unscrupulous things.  
Stock based compensation is supposed to align the interests of the CEO with that of the 
company, but in some cases, it has failed to do so.  If the CEO is able to manipulate the 
stock price in the period of time surrounding the vesting of his compensation stock, then 
the CEO will be doing harm to the company. If CEOs are unable to buy stock in their 
companies at preferential rates, then they may decide not to do so with their own money 
and may then not be as strongly interested in the share price of their companies.   
In cases where a company wants to force the CEO to look at longer-term 
measures of success other than stock price, it may be necessary for the board to use some 
other form of compensation.  It is upsetting to investors, however, if a company’s stock is 
underperforming from one quarter to the next and the CEO is receiving a cash bonus as a 
result.  If the board is not careful, it may find itself up for replacement by some activist 
shareholders looking to improve their returns and to oust a CEO who is not aligned with 
their interests.  Should the CEO be found guilty of some wrongdoing, the board members 
could end up in the uncomfortable predicament of defending themselves against a lawsuit 
for secondary wrongdoing and put their personal fortunes at risk.  (Rugen, 2008) 
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One of the key factors in keeping a CEO working for the interests of the company 
is for the independent board to meet regularly without the CEO present (Rugen, 2008) so 
that the board members can shape the direction they would like to see the company take.  
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2: CEO Compensation in the USA - post Sarbanes-Oxley 
Legislation 
In the fallout of the Enron accounting scandal of 2001, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation was passed in 2002.  Commonly known as SOX, This piece of legislation 
sought to bring reform to clamp down on the creative accounting practices that lead to 
false reporting of profits where none really existed, and to make sure that the audit 
process was independent of management and independent of the influence of other 
branches of the audit consultancy firm hired.  Transparency in governance was a big part 
of the SOX legislation, and there were sweeping reforms made with regard to the 
independence of boards and committees.  The need for reform at this point in the history 
of the United States economy was so great that this legislation passed with almost no 
opposition.  Amazingly, there was no regulation of executive compensation in this 
historic piece of legislation. (Dalton & Dalton, 2008)   
The SEC has drafted rules regarding compensation committees that require 
companies to submit a Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A) with its other 
SEC filings, and this document is supposed to be written in “plain English” so that any 
potential investor could theoretically easily understand how the CEO and other top 
executives are being compensated.  The reality of CD&A filings is less than satisfactory.  
The compensation committees have had great difficulty simplifying the language used to 
describe their mandates and the nuances of their compensation packages and thus have 
not pleased the SEC Chair with their attempts at clear language.  On average, most of 
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these documents are upwards of 5000 words and written at the PhD. level of readability. 
(Dalton & Dalton, 2008)  This is hardly what was intended by the spirit of the CD&A 
requirements. 
The restatement of earnings is one area where SOX actually does step in and take 
an active role in CEO compensation – well in the disgorgement of that compensation, 
anyways.  If there has been some form of misconduct or non-compliance in the financial 
statements of a public company, then the CEO and CFO can be made to give back, or 
rather the SEC can “claw back” any of the incentives that were paid to the those top 
executives up to 12 months after the financial information is made public.   This section 
of SOX, section 304, does not specify what kind of misconduct or whose misconduct is 
required for the clawback to kick in or who can file for one.  So far, only the SEC has 
been able to set a 304 disgorgement hearing in motion, and it actually took them until 
2007 to do so.  (Goodman & McPhee, 2008).   
SOX has no guidelines in place for equity compensation of CEOs.  For a 
company to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, they must hold a stock holder 
vote to approve any equity compensation plans – with some exceptions.  Employment 
inducement is an exception, as are some retirement plans under the internal revenue code. 
(Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP, 2008)  This is one place where there is room for abuse 
if the compensation committee is not on the ball.  There is the potential for a CEO to 
demand a large head-hunting fee in the form of stock or options, and then the same CEO 
could negotiate a large retirement plan without having to get shareholder approval under 
these rules.  
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That we don’t really know the details of what CEOs are earning with regard to 
their total compensation packages makes it difficult to judge the level of sincerity of 
some of the CEOs who volunteered to work without pay or for the token sum of one 
dollar until their companies managed to weather the economic crisis of 2008/2009.  If a 
CEO makes most of his money from the lavish stock package received as a welcoming 
gift to the new company or from a 401(a) plan for retirement, it is likely better for the 
CEO’s personal bottom line if the stock prices rise – another sure way to make stock 
prices go up is for the company to announce that a multimillion dollar expense (the 
CEO’s salary) has just disappeared from the books. 
In the case of Robert Nardelli, he was working for Chrysler for no salary at the 
time the company went Bankrupt.  But what was Nardelli’s total financial stake in 
Chrysler?  Nardelli claims that he has no severance package with Chrysler (Simon, 
2009), but what about other holdings in the company?  After his executives prevented the 
company from taking a second round of bailout money from the federal government in 
the USA, what was in it for him if the company failed as a result of the executives not 
signing on to a pay cap?   
Pay caps have been one of the very powers that SOX has given the average 
stockholder in theory; a non-binding shareholder vote on executive compensation.   The 
proxy power will allow ordinary shareholders to ask for (and maybe even get) some 
reform over how top-level employees are remunerated.   
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2.1 Reporting of CEO Income – Example: General Electric 
There are three main ways in which CEOs are paid:  Salary, Stock Options, and 
Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans.  Each of these things is reported in a slightly 
different way, and this has an impact on how shareholders see the executives in their 
company. As an example of how compensation is reported we will take a look at the 
compensation for General Electric CEO Jeff Immelt for the year 2008 as reported in the 
GE 2009 Proxy Statement CD&A. 
GE was ranked 6
th
 on the Fortune 500 list of companies (Fortune Magazine, 
2008), and the company is reported to have outperformed the S&P 500 index in the past 
year. (General Electric, 2009)The Proxy statement reports that there is no employment 
agreement between named executives (Immelt included) and the company and that there 
is also no severance agreement in place.  It goes further to state that were there to be the 
possibility of severance pay, that this would be voted on by shareholders if it were to be 
in excess of 2.99 times the value of the executive’s base salary and bonus.  It would 
appear that the company has taken a lesson from Home Depot. 
2.1.1 Salary 
For the year 2008, Jeff Immelt’s base salary was reported at $3.3 million USD and this 
was the same as the previous year.  Because of the difficult economic circumstances that 
prevented Immelt from reaching the goals set for this year, he declined his bonus and his 
long-term performance award.  This means that the cash portion of his compensation was 
reduced from $9.1Million in 2007 to just his base salary of $3.3Million USD in 2008.  
This is a decrease of 64%. (General Electric, 2009) 
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2.1.2 Equity compensation 
Jeff Immelt did receive equity compensation in the year 2008 in the amount of 
$2,044,000USD. This was less than half the amount of equity compensation he received 
in the previous year.  This was because his equity compensation is based entirely on key 
performance measures.  Because the company did not meet its goals for the year, 50% of 
the Restricted Shared Units allotted to Mr. Immelt in 2004 expired, and he was only able 
to realize 125,000 of them. Furthermore, the Units he did receive had a market value of 
only at only $11.10USD on their vesting date.  To further show his solidarity with 
shareholders, Immelt bought an additional 317,000 shares of GE stock on the open 
market, which put his ownership up to 3 times more than the company’s ownership 
requirements.  Considering the grant prices on his stock options from previous years 
(ranging in price from $27.05 to $57.31) the open market is now a real discount in 
comparison to what he would ordinarily have paid in the past. (General Electric, 2009) 
2.1.3 Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan reporting 
The Executive pension plan at GE includes both the regular employee pension 
plan and the Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (SERP).  Executives are normally 
not eligible for the SERP if they leave the company before the age of 60.  Immelt’s SERP 
compensation varies from one year to the next.  In 2008, he earned $3,563,466 in his 
pension plan.  This is much more than the two previous years when he received much 
more cash compensation in the way of a bonus and his stock compensation was worth 
more.  In 2006 his pension increased by $1,036,908 and in 2007 it increased by $78,290. 
(General Electric, 2009)  It appears as though the pension plan is being used to sweeten 
the pot in a poorly performing economy. This is not unusual in companies where the 
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board is not truly independent of the CEO.  A study out by Paul Kalyta out of Ottawa 
University found that CEO power over the board had a significant outcome with regard to 
the pension as a percentage of total income. (Kalyta, 2009)  In Immelt’s case, he serves 
as Chairman of the board, which definitely puts him in a position of power over the other 
board members.    
2.2 The fallout from SOX 
2.2.1 What effect CD&A requirements have had 
CD&A’s have been very difficult to craft. The transparency asked for by the SEC 
in these documents is not being met and likely cannot be met by many companies.  If a 
company were to publish all of the criteria upon which its compensation were based, it 
could put it at a distinct disadvantage.  A company’s internal business strategy needs to 
be kept from its competitors and were it divulged in publicly available documents, would 
be disastrous. (Dalton & Dalton, 2008)  An example of this would be a company that is 
trying to enter a certain geographical market through acquisitions of smaller companies.  
If this goal were published in its CD&A as one of the measures by which the CEO was to 
be judged for compensation purposes, it could derail its plans for expansion by alerting 
competitors. 
Shareholders have been exercising their proxy power since the SOX legislation.  
There have been an increasing number of Proxy votes on CEO compensation and the 
outcome of those non-binding votes has not been in favour of higher compensation for 
the executives (Dalton & Dalton, 2008).  There has been an increase in the number of 
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companies that have been going private and therefore do not have to file anything with 
the SEC. It is possible that this is one negative outcome of SOX. (Clark, 2007)   
2.2.2 Clawbacks 
The SEC has not made much use of the clawback clause in SOX.  This could be 
for two reasons; either the publicly held companies that have had earnings restatements in 
the post SOX era were all purely accidental and there was no fault involved, or the SEC 
does not have the resources to pursue these cases in the way that SOX intended.  I believe 
the latter is the more likely of the two possibilities.  Boards and shareholders have been 
taking the matter into their own hands.  Of 2100 companies surveyed in 2008, 300 of 
them had clawback provisions up from 14 companies with clawback provisions 4 years 
before. As well, there were 32 proposals for clawback provisions submitted by 
shareholders between 2004 and 2008.  These shareholder proposals have had the support 
of the SEC and companies are rarely allowed to exclude them. (Goodman & McPhee, 
2008) 
There has been research to suggest that the career penalties faced by executives 
from restatement firms are already very strict.  A study by Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 
found that firms which restated earnings generally had higher turnover of upper 
management than control firms.  Executives who had been let go in the wake of a 
restatement scandal were less likely to find new employment due to the stigma of their 
role in the restatement.  Those who were able to find new employment were not able to 
find the same level of work and compensation that they previously enjoyed. (Desai, 
Hogan, & Wilkins, 2006) 
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3: Best Practices for CEO Compensation 
In order to examine best practices for CEO compensation, we must take a look at 
all of the players involved.  We will first examine the Board of Directors who has the 
final say in the amount of the CEO’s remuneration.  The group that advises the board at 
large on this issue is the compensation committee.  The compensation committee may 
take the advice of an outside consultant called a compensation consultant.  This 
consultant may provide research and calculations to help the committee find the best 
level and format of compensation to offer its top executives.  The following will detail 
the interaction between these players and outline the typical factors that they consider in 
crafting a compensation agreement. 
3.1 The Board of Directors Compensation Committee 
The compensation committee should be made up of independent board members.  
This requires that the board members on the committee are not in the direct employ of the 
CEO and do not have any conflicts of interest such as sitting on other boards with the 
CEO of the company. The compensation committee should have clear strategic goals for 
the company in mind when crafting the CEO’s compensation package as well as keeping 
the interests of the ordinary shareholders in mind.   
Problems arise when the compensation committee is not truly independent of the 
CEO.  If the members of the compensation committee are company insiders, there is a 
potential for pressure from the CEO to influence their compensation package decisions.  
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There is an argument that industry insiders make the best board members because they 
will have the background to understand where the CEO is coming from and not be 
intimidated into making decisions because of their lack of knowledge.  (Bragues, 2007)  
There is a duty for board members to inform themselves and to do independent research 
to make sure that the goals set for a company are done so in the interests of the company 
and not the interests of the CEO or other high level executives, and compensation 
committees are coming under more scrutiny to make sure that they are behaving truly 
independently from their CEOs.   
3.2 Compensation Consulting Firms 
Compensation committees should be able to hire outside consultants as they see 
fit.  There are firms that specialize in compensation consulting, and there are other firms 
that are general consultancy firms that offer compensation consulting as part of their 
overall menu of services.  There are two schools of thought on the use of consultants.  On 
one hand, compensation consultants can provide expert advice on what compensation 
packages look like across an industry and in comparison to comparable companies.  This 
can be very useful and can make a company’s CEO compensation more uniform with that 
of similar companies and thus draw less attention from shareholders and other critics.  On 
the other hand, there is the opinion that the use of compensation consultants drives up the 
cost of compensation. (Clark, 2007)  There are a few different reasons why this might 
happen, and some of them are quite avoidable.  
If a compensation consulting firm is trying to curry favour with the CEO, then 
there is the temptation for them to make high salary recommendations.  In order to justify 
large compensation packages, comparisons with dissimilar companies might be made.  If 
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the consultant is comparing two companies that are in a similar industry but have vastly 
different earnings, then a regression analysis might be done to figure out how to scale 
equivalent compensation on the basis of the similar companies of different sizes.  In some 
cases, the regression will have too low an R-square value to be significant (less than 0.25) 
in which case it should not be used. (Lipman & Hall, 2008)   
Another area of great controversy is the independence of the compensation 
consultant.  In cases where the compensation consultant is a branch of a firm that 
provides other, larger revenue generating services to the company, the compensation 
tends to be much higher than it would have been if the compensation consultants had no 
conflict of interests.  In a study that measured fee ratios, the 25 Fortune 250 companies 
whose compensation consultants were deemed to have the highest conflict of interests 
paid their CEOs an average of 67% more than companies who used completely 
independent compensation consultants. (United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2007)  It is therefore imperative that 
compensation committees hire their compensation consultation firms completely 
separately from audit and other higher fee consultants.   
For truly independent compensation consultants, the compensation committee 
should make clear that the contract will be only for compensation consultation and will 
not extend to other areas of consultation for a period of time.  Some consultation firms 
require their compensation consultants to do cross-selling of firm services and use 
compensation consulting as a foot in the door to sell more lucrative services such as 
audit. (United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, 2007) This is more potential for conflict of interests and the compensation 
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committee needs to protect the company from salary inflation due to sales tactics on the 
part of consultants. 
3.3 Crafting a Compensation Package 
When one is trying to decide what to pay for something, it pays to comparison 
shop.  For Compensation committees looking to pay a CEO this is done by benchmarking 
with like companies.  Benchmark companies should be of a similar size or in a similar 
industry to get a valid comparison.  This is one area that a compensation consultant can 
really be of great assistance to the compensation committee. If the committee has a 
philosophy about how they would like their compensation to measure up to that of 
benchmark firms, then the compensation consultant can use their extensive proprietary 
database to follow those guidelines or conduct original commissioned research of SEC 
filings and other publicly available information.  If the committee is less certain of how it 
would like to measure up to other firms, the compensation consultant can conduct an 
analysis of what the committee is looking to achieve and what resources it has to put 
toward a CEO compensation package and make recommendations based on the results of 
that analysis. (Welch-O'Connor, 2009) 
Another measure to take into account is that of internal pay equity amongst 
executives.  The CEO should not make so much more than the top executives in a firm 
that there is a terrific inequity of pay.  The CEO is a member of a management team, and 
as such shouldn’t be placed on a pedestal in terms of compensation, but at the same time, 
CEO compensation cannot be measured by the lowest paid salaries in a company.  
Internal pay equity is a delicate balance and the compensation committee needs to 
consider its company’s overall philosophy with regard to the value of its workforce when 
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deciding how much more the CEO should receive in comparison to other employees. 
(Lipman & Hall, 2008) 
One goal of any CEO compensation package is to align the interests of the CEO 
with the interests of the company to eliminate the agency issue.  One of the difficulties in 
writing such a contract is that it can be incredibly complex almost to the point of ceasing 
to motivate the desired behaviors if the person cannot readily see the connection between 
actions and consequences.  One of the consequences of a CEO’s actions is stock price.  
Because the CEO is directly responsible for making decisions that will have an effect on 
stock price, many companies require the CEO to own a certain minimum number of 
shares at all times.   
Another way to tie CEO compensation to stock price is to allow the CEO stock 
options.  This means that the CEO will have the option to buy the stock after a certain 
time has passed.  At that time, the options have vested, and the CEO can exercise the 
options and purchase the stock.  If the value of the stock has surpassed the option price at 
that point, then the CEO makes a profit.  
Options can be fraught with dangers for the company.  Backdating is one practice 
that was used pre-SOX to the benefit of CEOs and to the detriment of the shareholder.  
The executives would backdate the purchase of their options to the point where the price 
was even lower than their strike price, and then turn around and sell them when the price 
was the highest – kind of like picking the winner after the race has been run and 
backdating your bet to the starting line.   
  21 
Another illegal activity that was taking place was the spring-loading of options.  
This was when CEOs would exercise their options directly before an announcement that 
would drive up the share price.   
To prevent both backdating and spring loading of stock options, they have to be 
treated very carefully, especially with regard to timing.  The compensation committee 
should only make grants at set times of year (such as end of quarter, or some other 
regularly occurring time) or in case of certain events such as a new hire or a merger with 
another company.  When the compensation committee does make a grant, it should be 
outside of normal trading hours so that the last stock price can be used, and they must 
actually meet in order to grant the options rather than just give written consent, because it 
is hard to prove when written consent was actually given. (Lipman & Hall, 2008)  This 
can help communicate to shareholders that the CEO must purchase shares and assume the 
same risk associated with that purchase that any other shareholder would face.   
A CEO must be motivated to conduct the company in such a manner that it 
achieves its long-term goals while maintaining profitability in the short term.  To insure 
that long-term strategies are adhered to for the health of the company, the compensation 
committee needs to discuss with the CEO what those goals are and what acceptable 
milestones of those goals might be.  In this way, the CEO can be rewarded if the long-
term goals are met or penalized if they are not.  The goals should be specific and 
quantified with regard to their worth to the company.  The achievement of these goals 
will afford the CEO bonuses as a percentage of his base pay.  The committee should be 
sure to differentiate between the movement of the overall market and the actual 
performance of the company.  There is less motivation for a CEO to manage effectively 
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in boom times if the market will provide his performance bonus for him. (Lipman & Hall, 
2008) 
Perquisites (perks) have come under scrutiny recently and according to the SEC 
must be listed in detail if they amount to more than $10,000 per year.  In order to avoid 
listing these benefits for shareholder (who might object to the memberships of exclusive 
country clubs being provided to the CEO at great expense to the company) some 
companies elected to simply add the cash equivalent of the perquisites to the base pay of 
the CEOs.  
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4: BC Crown Corporations – CEO Compensation 
The crown corporations of British Columbia are required to get approval from the 
Public Sector Employers Council (PSEC) for any executive compensation plan they 
devise.  The policies set out under the Public Sector Employers Act cover Excluded and 
Executive Employees.  To qualify, the CEO must be paid in excess of $125,000.  This act 
specifically addresses compensation plans as well as severance plans and vacation and 
sick leave accrual.  Some of the compensation plan information that is required by PSEC 
includes base and total salary range for the position, sectoral standards and guidelines, 
and description of Perquisites, benefits, and bonus and incentive pay.  As of 2008, PSEC 
put a salary cap in place for all public employees of $550,000 total compensation.  This 
meant, in effect, that there will be no way for some of the Crown Corporation CEOs to 
reach their maximum variable pay because that could put them over the salary cap 
instituted by the legislature. (Nancy Olewiler, 2009)   
4.1 BC Hydro 
4.1.1 BC Hydro CEO Compensation 
BC Hydro is the electric utility for the province of British Columbia.  The 
compensation philosophy outlined in the CD&A for BC Hydro compares BC Hydro 
executive salaries with local administrative roles, Canada wide manager and professional 
roles in all companies over $1Billion in revenue regardless of industry, and roles specific 
to Canadian electric utilities and oil and gas companies.  Pay for executives has both a 
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merit based component and a variable incentive based component.  The CEO for BC 
Hydro is Bob Elton.  Mr. Elton has been the CEO at BC Hydro since 2003.  For fiscal 
year 2007/2008, Mr. Elton received a total compensation package of $570,897, of which, 
$169,920 was incentive plan compensation.  In this year, his salary was $294,025.  The 
rest of the total compensation package was made up by pension in the amount of $72,036 
and other compensation in the amount of $34,916. (BC Hydro, 2008 (b)) 
The pension plan for the CEO of BC Hydro uses a formula of 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
2% ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 60 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑕𝑠. 
  This pension plan requires the participant contribute at a rate of 6.31% of gross 
earnings.  The plan also allows for purchase of additional years of service at the rate of 12 
time bank days or equivalent in cash per year purchased. (BC Hydro, 2008 (b)) 
4.1.2 BC Hydro Company Performance Measures 
The main categories that BC Hydro uses to judge its performance are: Safety, 
Reliability, Financial Results, Customer Satisfaction, People, and Environment.  In the 
2008Annual Report, the company outlines what its goals for these categories were, the 
measures of those goals, and whether or not the goals were met. 
Safety was slightly problematic for the company this year.  The corporate goals 
for Injury Frequency and Injury Severity were not met.  With regard to Injury frequency, 
the target of 1.9 incidents per 200,000 hours worked was lower than the actual frequency 
for 2008 of 2.8 incidents per 200,000 hours worked.  The company has raised the 
threshold for 2009 to 2.4 incidents per 200,000 hours worked.  The Injury Severity target 
of 25 calendar days lost per 200,000hours worked was not met either.  The actual number 
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of days lost per 200,000 hours worked was 39.3.  The report notes that the number of 
serious incidents was reduced, but that several vehicle incidents had a big impact on the 
number of days lost.   
Reliability has several different measures.  The first measure of reliability 
performance used by BC Hydro is Winter Generation Availability Factor.  The target for 
this measure was 96.20% and was not met.  The actual Winter Generation Ability Factor 
was measured at 94.88%.  The company negotiated load curtailment agreements with 
some of its large customers to manage the risk of shortfall in the future.  Four of the 
measures used are to quantify disruptions to customers.  These are: ASAI (which 
measures the percentage of time power is available) CAIDI (average number of 
interruption hours per interrupted customer) CEMI-4 (customers experiencing multiple 
disruptions) and CELID-6 (customers experiencing longest interruption duration)  Due to 
the particularly bad storm season, the company did not meet any of these targets, but 
when the actual numbers were normalized for major events, then the company found it 
would have met the CELID-6 and CEMI-4 targets had it not been for the severity of the 
season.   
Demand side management is the flip side of the reliability coin.  Because BC 
Hydro is a monopoly, it must make sure that demand stays below its supply capacity.  
Some of the demand side management activities that are highlighted by this measure are 
conservation, efficiency, and load displacement.  The target of 300 Gigawatt hours saved 
was surpassed at 326. 
BC Hydro set its financial goals by net income for the year 2008.  This goal was 
exceeded.  The target net income for 2008 was $365 Million and the actual net income 
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was $369 Million.  It was noted that the company benefited from high water inflows for 
the year and that this lowered the overall cost of energy.  It is important to remember that 
BC Hydro was only allowed to make a maximum net income of $369 Million by the 
BCUC.  
Customer satisfaction targets for the year were 80% satisfied or very satisfied as 
measured on a 4 point survey scale across the index of the following drivers: providing 
reliable electricity, value for money, commitment to customer service, acting in the best 
interest of British Columbians, and efforts to communicate with customers and 
communities.  The company surpassed this target with an actual score of 90% satisfaction 
rate. 
BC Hydro’s goals regarding its people are measured by vacancy rate and by 
employee engagement.  The target vacancy rate of positions for 2008 was 10.2% and the 
actual rate was 8.7% employee engagement is measured on a five point scale.  Target 
levels for 2008 were set at 3.5 but actual engagement was only measured at 3.36.   
Environmental goals are measured by how many Environmental Regulatory 
compliance incidents are recorded over the year.  The target number of incidents for the 
year was 15.  The actual number of incidents recorded was 39.  The company fell far 
short of meeting its target. (BC Hydro, 2008 (a)) 
4.2 BCLC 
4.2.1 BCLC CEO Compensation 
In 2007, the BCLC decided not to renew CEO Vic Poleschuk’s contract and in so 
doing, triggered his severance package.  This entitled him to 18 months of severance pay 
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(1 month for every year worked up to a maximum of 18 months).  This payout caused 
some criticism from BC opposition legislature members.  The opposition pointed to the 
fact that the interim CEO for BCLC was the former deputy minister of the Premier. ( BC 
NDP, 2007)  Because of this turnover, it is more difficult to see the actual CEO 
compensation for that year. What BCLC does provide, however, is a good accounting of 
what monies are being paid out to former CEO Poleschuk.  Some of the terms of his 
retirement package are: 2 years of pension credit for each year worked from October 1, 
1999, contributions to the maximum pension plan allowance are made at4.4% of earnings 
under the Year’s Maximum Pensionable Earnings and 6% thereafter.  In Poleschuk’s 
case, he is also eligible for the supplementary pension plan which mirrors the retirement 
pension plan but allows higher limits than the Income Tax Act allows for a regular 
retirement pension plan.  In fiscal year 2007/2008, Poleschuk’s total compensation was 
$842,201.  This number includes severance - $42,307.69, salary continuance - 
$204,080.37, performance bonus - $144,375, and a lump sum of $19,044 for long-term 
disability. (British Columbia Lottery Corporation, 2008 (b)) 
4.2.2 BCLC Company Performance Measures 
BCLC sets out three goals in its annual report.  They are: to provide outstanding 
gaming entertainment generating income for the public good, to be a respected 
organization that has a broad base of public support, and to have a workforce 
passionately driving the success of the business.  The company uses many different 
measurements of these goals.   
In the arena of providing outstanding gaming entertainment generating income for 
the public good, BCLC measures revenue generation, operating cost ratio, net income, 
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full-time employee equivalents, player participation, and player satisfaction.  The 
financial goals of revenue generation ($2.495 Billion target, $2.559Billion actual) and net 
income ($1.033Billion target, $1.110 actual) were exceeded by the corporation in the 
year 2008, and the company also considers itself to have achieved its operating ratio 
target (11.1% target, 10.9% actual), but when it came to full time equivalents, the 
corporation did not meet its target (target 633, actual 638).  Both player participation and 
player satisfaction targets were not achieved for the year of 2008.  The actual 
participation rate among adult residents who had played a lottery game or visited a 
gaming facility in the month prior to the publication of the data was 58% which fell short 
of the target participation rate of 67%.  Player satisfaction as measured by a continuous 
tracking study and gaming facility exit interviews was 84%, which did not meet the target 
of 88%.   
With regard to their goal of being a respected organization that has a broad base 
of public support, BCLC measured four separate areas.  Public support of gaming was 
measured at 62% of adults in British Columbia supporting legalized gaming.  This 
exceeded the target level that was 52%.  The public support of BCLC was measured at 
64% of adults in BC having a favourable impression of the organization, which was 
below the target level of 65%.  The target of 56% of adults agreeing that BCLC markets 
in a socially responsible way was exceeded, with an actual agreement rate of 61%.  
Public awareness of the beneficiaries of gaming was measured as a percentage of adults 
who have an awareness of how gaming income is distributed.  The target rate of 35% 
awareness was achieved. 
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The goal of having a workforce passionately driving the success of the business 
was measured with an employee engagement “pulse check” or survey of 81% of 
employees.  This survey revealed that the actual engagement level of employees was only 
44%, which was lower than the target level of 60%. (BC Lottery Corporation, 2008 (a)) 
4.3 BCTC 
4.3.1 BCTC CEO Compensation 
BCTC uses an external consultant to compare its compensation with that of 
comparable companies in the private sector.  Because the salary and incentive portions of 
its compensation packages were found to be typically lower in value than those of its 
private sector counterparts, BCTC has instituted paid time-off programs and enhanced 
pension plans for its executives. In Fiscal year 2008, President and CEO Jane Peverett 
received a base salary of $282,134.  The base salary for the CEO is set by predetermining 
a salary range which the board and the government of British Columbia regularly review 
and renegotiate.  When the base pay is set, the CEOs annual performance is reviewed by 
the board taken into account by the Human Resources, Safety, & Environment 
Committee. 
The CEO sets goals at the beginning of each fiscal year and these are approved by 
the board.  The board uses these goals to evaluate the CEO’s performance at the end of 
the fiscal year and uses this to determine the CEOs performance pay.  The CEO’s 
performance pay is attributed 30% to individual achievement and 70% on reaching 
corporate goals.  The target amount for this award is 30% of the CEO’s base pay. In 
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Fiscal Year 2008, the CEO received an incentive plan award of $107,303 which is 39% 
of base pay. 
Like the other Crown Corporations, BCTC’s CEO has a pension plan that 
includes a Supplementary Retirement Plan to cover benefits over the limit set by the 
Income Tax Act.  The current service cost of the unfunded SRP combined with the 
company contributions to the registered pension plan for Peverett is $51,853.  Peverett 
also received $39,996 in other compensation for fiscal year 2008 which included health 
benefits, paid time off, a vehicle allowance, paid parking, CPP, EI, and Worksafe 
premiums, and payouts of earned time off, bringing her total compensation package to 
$481,286. (British Columbia Transmission Corporation, 2008)  
4.3.2 BCTC Company Performance Measures 
BCTC used six goal areas to set performance targets in 2008.  These strategic 
goal areas were: Reliability and Service, Market Efficiency, Environment and Safety, 
Relationships, Organization and People, and Cost Management.   
BCTC aimed to achieve reliability improvements and deliver outstanding service 
in 2008.  This goal was measured using SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration 
Index).  The target for 2008 of 2.18interruption hours was not met.  Actual interruption 
hours were 2.43.  This is due to the major weather-related events that took place in this 
year.   
As yet, BCTC has no measures in place to judge its Market Efficiency goal, but is 
developing some for the future. 
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BCTC measures its Environment and Safety goal in two ways.  The first is a 
count of reportable environmental incidents.  The target number of such incidents was 9, 
and this target was met for the year 2008.  Safety is measured by a count of lost time 
accidents for both BCTC and independent contractors.  BCTC met its own goal of 0 lost 
time accidents, and the target for contractors, set at 17 lost time accidents, was also met. 
The relationships goal of building open and constructive relationships with First 
Nations and stakeholders is measured in an annual survey.  The target for positive or 
neutral responses in this survey was 90%, but the actual rate of 87% positive or neutral 
responses failed to meet the target. 
The goal for organization and people was to build an Engaged and highly skilled 
workforce.  This was measured with a survey that measures employee engagement on a 5 
point scale.  The company set a target employee engagement score of 3.4 and more than 
met this with an actual score of 3.53. 
The final goal outlined for BCTC is to maintain prudent financial management of 
capital and operating expenditures.  The measure used for this is called OMA 
(Operations, Maintenance, and Administration) actual against plan.  The target was to be 
within 98% to 102% of plan levels for OMA costs, and the actual level was 101.7% of 
plan levels.  This target was met. (BC Transmission Corporation, 2008 (a)) 
4.4 ICBC 
4.4.1 ICBC CEO Compensation 
ICBC has recently changed its method of compensation to include more 
performance based elements and to be more competitive in the labour market and attract 
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more experienced and better qualified employees.  The comparator groups used to 
establish ICBCs base rate of pay include: Canadian Insurance companies, Canadian 
Industry (revenue$1B to $10B) and Canadian government and Crown Corporations.  
ICBC used information from the database of compensation consulting firm Towers Perrin 
to arrive at these comparisons.  The CEOs salary is not set by the board.  The CEO 
receives Short Term Incentive Pay (STIP) as well as Long Term Incentive Pay (LTIP).  
The Short term incentive pay is split 75% corporate performance and 25% personal 
performance for the CEO.  The STIP award can range anywhere from 0 to 35% of the 
CEOs base pay, but the actual target is 20%.  The LTIP program defers payout over a 
period of three years and in so doing, brings the interests of the CEO and the long term 
interests of the company together.  The CEO at ICBC receives a modest perquisite 
allowance of $18,500.  The CEO compensation plan includes both a regular pension plan 
and a Supplemental Employee Retirement plan to cove the gap between what the income 
tax act will allow the regular plan to cover, and a retirement benefit that is commensurate 
with the level of salary expected by such a high level professional as a CEO.  In the year 
2007, Paul Taylor, CEO of ICBC earned a grand total of $524,750.  This amount includes 
Base salary, long and short term incentive Pay, pension, health benefits, and other forms 
of compensation.  (Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2008 (a))  As Taylor 
voluntarily resigned in May of 2008, he was not entitled to severance. (CanWest 
MediaWorks Publications Inc, 2008) 
4.4.2 ICBC Company Performance Measures 
ICBC outlines four performance goal areas in its 2008 annual report.  They are: 
Customer Focus, Financial Responsibility, High Performing, Engaged, and Capable 
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People, and Operational Excellence.  Each of the goals has specific measures of 
performance. 
Performance in customer focus is measured in three different areas: insurance 
services satisfaction, claims services satisfaction, and driver licensing satisfaction.  The 
planned level of insurance services satisfaction for 2008 was set at 93%.  The actual level 
of insurance services satisfaction, as measured by ongoing surveys conducted by an 
independent research firm was also 93%.  The planned level of satisfaction in the area of 
claims services was set at 83% for the year 2008.  Actual claims services satisfaction 
surpassed planned levels, and reached 85%.  The planned level of driver licensing 
satisfaction (91%) was also surpassed by the actual results for 2008(93%). 
Financial responsibility is a goal that ICBC measures by several different means.  
They are: minimum capital test, combined ratio, loss ratio, expense ratio, and investment 
return.  The minimum Capital Test compares the company’s available capital to the 
capital required. This shows the company’s ability to protect customers from external 
negative drivers that might otherwise require rate hikes.  The planned minimum Capital 
level for 2008 was 150% and the actual level far exceeded this at 209%.  The combined 
ratio, an overall insurance industry profitability ratio, had target levels of 106.1% 
(indicating a planned loss) and actual levels were 95.9% (indicating an actual profit).  
This success is attributed to low claims adjustments and higher premiums earned.  The 
low claims adjustments may in part be due to the dryer weather experienced by drivers in 
2008.  The loss ratio measures the profitability of insurance products; the lower the 
percentage, the more profitable the insurance product is.  The loss ratio planned by ICBC 
for2008 was 87%.  The actual loss ratio for the year was much more favourable at 77.6%.  
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The expense ratio, which measures the percentage of non-claims costs to insurance 
premium dollars earned, was planned at 19.5% for 2008.  ICBC did better than that, 
coming in at only 18.8%. Investments are measured against standard market benchmarks, 
and the target for the year is set at 0.269% over the benchmark.  The Benchmark for 2008 
turned out to be 4% (becomes target rate of 4.269%) and ICBC surpassed this with an 
actual return of 4.53% for its investments in 2008. 
ICBC measures how well it is achieving its goal of having high performing, 
engaged and capable people by use of an employee engagement index.  The planned rate 
of engagement for 2008 was 52%.  The actual rate was quite a bit less than this at 44%.  
The target for 2009 has been lowered to 48%.  
There are two measures of operational excellence at ICBC: insurance operating 
cost per policy and driver licensing cost per transaction.  The planned insurance operating 
cost per policy for 2008 was $193. The actual cost was lower than target at $189 per 
policy.  This was attributed to lower than plan operating expenses and acquisition costs.  
The driver licensing cost per transaction was planned at $9.4 per transaction, but the 
actual costs were slightly higher at $9.7 per transaction.  This was due to lower than 
expected transaction volumes. (Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2008 (b)) 
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5: BC Crown Corporations – Financials 
To determine the financial performance of each of the companies, I took the 5 
most recent years’ financial statements from each company and looked at the 
performance of each over time.  In the case of crown corporations, there are many 
financial ratios that do not apply because there is only one shareholder (the government 
of the people of British Columbia) and that shareholder dictates what the corporations are 
allowed to charge for services and what portion of income earned may be kept as retained 
earnings and what must be returned to the customers (who are the ultimate shareholders 
as well).  There is also the problem of CEO turnover.  In this analysis, while I look at 
partial years and prior years for comparative purposes, I focus on actual full years served 
by the CEOs to get a sense of their successes as managers. 
5.1 BC Hydro 
Return on Net Assets   𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
9.26% 10.43% 8.83% 9.08% 7.28 
 
2004 was Bob Elton’s first full year of managing BC Hydro.  The RONA for that 
year was only 7.28%, but he quickly brought that up to a robust 9.08% which has 
remained somewhat steady since.  There is one anomaly year in 2007, which could be 
attributed to the relatively low operating expenses incurred that year relative to stable 
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revenues as compared to the year prior.  In 2008 operating costs rose and subsequently, 
the RONA returned to near its previous levels.   
Net Profit Margin  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖 𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
7.60% 9.71% 6.17% 10.79% 2.86% 
 
The Net Profit Margin shows more volatility than the RONA.  In 2004the sickly 
2.86% Net Profit margin can be attributed in part to the extremely high amortization 
charges that the company was deducting as an expense at that time. 
Amortization as a Percent of Revenue 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
7.58% 9.02% 9.53% 11.01% 15.74% 
The extreme increase in Net profit margin in 2005 is also due in part to a onetime 
payment from Alcan, so the following year’s Net Profit margin is probably more 
indicative of the level of change that took place as a result of management’s direction.  In 
2007there is another Net Profit Margin peak.  This once again points to the low 
operations expenses for that year.  
Debt to Asset Ratio 
 
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
85.89% 86.14% 86.56% 86.35% 86.16% 
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The debt to asset ratio has remained very steady under Elton’s management, 
which is commendable in light of the heavy property plant and equipment additions made 
in 2008.  In years prior, the PPE of the company remained fairly stable, the large increase 
in 2008 indicates expansion.  While overall debt increased in an amount similar to the 
PPE increase, Current Portion of Long Term Debt was actually reduced and Other Debt 
also saw a reduction.  This indicates good management of funding sources and shows that 
the company is able to balance new expenditures without hurting liquidity 
 
Operations Expense as a percent of revenue 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
10.65% 6.58% 8.65% 7.87% 10.46% 
In 2008 the Operations Expense as a percent of revenue exceeded that of 2004.  This 
could be due to the PPE acquisition in 2008.  It is possible that the new asset is not yet in 
service and generating revenue.  At this point, it is not a strike against management, but if 
the ratio doesn’t improve over time, it will be of concern. (BC Hydro, 2004 (a)) (BC 
Hydro, 2006) (BC Hydro, 2008 (a)) 
 
5.2 BCLC 
Vic Poleschuk was CEO of BCLC from 1999 until 2007; after the BC lottery 
retailer ticket switching scandal, he was let go and replaced by Interim CEO Dana 
Hayden. (British Columbia Lottery Corporation, 2008 (b)) I have chosen to examine the 
most recent five years of data available for BCLC to get an idea of how BCLC measures 
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up with the other crown corporations in a similar economic climate.  2008, while not 
directly under the control of Vic Poleschuk, would have been influenced by actions and 
policies set by him in the previous year, so I have included it in my analysis. 
Return on Net Assets  𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
551% 477% 512% 452% 998% 
Lotteries are not fixed asset heavy businesses. The RONA for BCLC does not 
compare directly with that of BC Hydro, but gives us an idea of how the BCLC assets 
were being managed from year to year.  The standout is the change from2004to 2005.  
The RONA is halved in 2005 and never returns to 2004 levels.  What is the cause for this 
drastic drop?  A doubling of Property Plant and Equipment is the most obvious answer.  
According to the 2006 annual report, BCLC’s PPE for 2005 was $112,003,000 as 
compared to $55,106,000 in 2004.  The Casino at Hastings Park Racetrack was behind 
schedule in this year and did not come on line as scheduled.  Despite this, Net Income 
was not affected and the corporation posted increased earnings every year of the period in 
question. 
Net Profit Margin  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖 𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
42.55% 42.01% 40.81% 40.39% 38.51% 
Starting in 2004, BCLC’s Net Profit Margin rose consistently.  This is likely a 
direct result of careful management and movement into newer products such as electronic 
gambling.  Over the 5 years, the Net Profit Margin was a success for Poleschuk and his 
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team. (BC Lottery Corporation, 2005) (BC Lottery Corporation, 2007) (BC Lottery 
Corporation, 2008 (a)) 
5.3 BCTC 
Jane Peverett became CEO of BCTC in April of 2005.  This corporation was only 
formed in May of 2003, 2 years before and at that time, Peverett was CFO. (British 
Columbia Transmission Corporation)  This CEO has had the opportunity to shape the 
company from the outset, but we will focus on the financial data starting from the 2006 
annual report and only use the data from the 2004and 2005 reports for comparison.. 
Return on Net Assets  𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
3.97% 4.81% 17.08% 6.97% 3.02% 
 The Return on Net Assets for BCTC has some wild swings; most of this has to do 
with the Tariff rate that has been approved by the utility commission.  The theory behind 
the tariff rate is that BCTC will charge the residents of British Columbia no more than is 
absolutely necessary for BCTC and BC Hydro’s revenue requirements plus a 
maintenance charge and that any surpluses will be returned to the public.  In some years, 
the surplus collected was quite marked – such was the case in 2006, when not only was 
the RONA at an all time high, but so was Cash on the balance sheet at $36,038,000 
(almost triple its balance in its next highest year).  If we disregard 2006 as an outlier and 
use 2005 for the basis of comparison, we see that the RONA is steadily declining.  What 
is the reason for this?  Property, Plant, and Equipment has more than doubled from 
$61,849,000 in 2005 to $155,713,000.  This combined with the fact that the earnings 
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have been relatively stable has meant that the Assets do not appear to be earning more 
money for the company.  This is misleading, however, because the BCUC does not allow 
for an increase of profits at BCTC without a valid revenue requirement. 
Net Profit Margin  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖 𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
1.65% 1.65% 6.56% 3.57% 2.19% 
The Net Profit margin, like the RONA, has one outlier year, but can still be studied if that 
year is disregarded.  In 2007 and 2008, the net profit margin was completely steady 
at1.65%.  This is more than a coincidence.  In 2008, a change in accounting created a 
slight increase in earnings ($400,000) and this money was refunded to the public through 
the Revenue Deferral account.  It would seem that BCTC and the utility commission have 
found the net profit margin that is acceptable for the corporation.    
Debt to Asset Ratio 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
76.47% 72.29% 72.50% 74.05% 69.44% 
2008 shows a significant increase in the Debt to Asset Ratio for BCTC.  This is 
explained by the PPE increase in the same year.  The main areas of acquisition with 
regards to PPE are buildings ($75,908,000 in 2008 as compared to $2,140,000 the 
previous year) and computer hardware and software ($43,396,000 in 2008 compared to 
$19,344,000 in 2007) These increases may be due to the new program going forth to 
expand transmission services from Surrey to Bellingham and expansion of dynamic 
scheduling services (allowing for generation, transmission, and sale of power from BC 
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when demand is high in other areas) to Montana.  (BC Tramsmission Corporation, 2004) 
(BC Transmission Corporation, 2006) (BC Transmission Corporation, 2008 (a)) 
 
5.4 ICBC 
Paul Taylor’s time as CEO of ICBC began in October of 2004 and ended May 2 
of 2008 amid a scandal involving rebuilt cars being sold from the corporation’s research 
facility.  Because his time at ICBC began late in 2004 and ended partway through 2008, 
the years of performance that are most relevant would be from 2005-2007. 
 
Return on Net Assets  𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
10.04% 11.85% 9.54% 11.05% 13.07% 
In 2005, Paul Taylor’s management team brought the RONA down by 2% from the 
previous year and in 2006 it came down another 1.5%.  What caused this?  In 2005, EBIT 
was down from the previous year, but the overall assets had gone up.  This means that 
while the company was getting larger, it wasn’t becoming more profitable.  One of the 
large expenses that year was a bigger than usual charge for claims incurred.  The claims 
were up from $2,221,258,000 in 2004 to $2,525,177,000 in 2005.  This is an increase of 
12% on the biggest expense item from the income statement.  The following year saw 
another sizeable year over year when claims incurred increased to $2,612,581,000 or 
4.47% up from 2006.  In 2008, the year in the middle of which Taylor resigned, this trend 
stopped and claims remained nearly unchanged from 2007. 
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Net Profit Margin  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖 𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
13.44% 18.10% 10.60% 6.27% 12.78% 
The Net profit margin is quite volatile for this company.  Compared to 2004, the profit 
margin is cut in half in 2005and by2007 it is nearly three times its 2005 rate.  The reason 
for this can be seen in the movement of net income.  Between 2004 and 2005 there was a 
48.85% reduction in net income whereas 2006 and 2007 both showed increases in net 
income of 43.47% and 45.49% respectively.  These increases stem from underwriting 
income and losses over the years and to the previously mentioned increase in 
commissions. 
Debt to Asset Ratio 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
76.03% 77.86% 83.17% 85.69% 87.61% 
The assets of ICBC grew steadily over the five year period.  In 2004, the 
company’s assets were $7.5 Billion and by 2008 they reached $11.5 Billion.  During this 
time the company’s liabilities also increased from $6.5 Billion to $8.7 Billion.  Therefore, 
while assets increased by an average of 10% per year, liabilities were only increasing by 
an average of 7% per year at the same time. This signifies that the company must have 
found another source of funding for these assets.  Further investigation shows that 
retained earnings rose by23% per year on average over the period from 2004 to 2008, 
showing that management has been reinvesting profits back into the company and 
keeping it in a financially healthy position.  (Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 
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2004) (Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2006) (Insurance Corporation of 
British Columbia, 2008 (b)) 
5.5 Comparing the 4 crown corporations by size, complexity of 
performance criteria, and success 
Table 2 Comparison of 4 Crown Corporations 
 BC Hydro BCLC BCTC ICBC 
Size 
(measured by 
total assets) 
$13,610,000,000 $316,488,000 $287,257,000 $11,476,492,000 
Size 
(measured by 
total revenue) 
$4,855,000,000 $2,559,187,000 $193,405,000 $3,700,389,000 
Complexity of 
performance 
criteria 
(how many 
different 
measures of 
company 
performance 
are taken into 
account) 
 
6 performance 
areas measured 
 
13 measures of 
these areas 
 
3 Performance 
areas measured 
 
11 measures of 
these areas 
 
6 Performance 
areas measured 
 
7 measures of 
these areas 
 
4 Performance 
areas measured 
 
11 measures of 
these areas 
Success 
(what 
percentage of 
performance 
targets were 
achieved or 
surpassed) 
4/13 targets 
were achieved 
or surpassed 
 
31% 
6/11 targets 
were achieved 
or surpassed 
 
55% 
5/7 targets were 
achieved or 
surpassed 
 
71% 
9/11 targets 
were achieved 
or surpassed 
 
82% 
(BC Hydro, 2008 (a)) (BC Lottery Corporation, 2008 (a)) (BC Transmission 
Corporation, 2008 (a)) (Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2008 (b)) 
Both BC Hydro and BCTC looked at more areas of performance in their 
performance reviews than ICBC or BCLC.  For some of the corporations, their measures 
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of performance in some areas vastly outnumbered their measures of other performance 
areas.  An example of this is BC Hydro’s reliability, which is measured in 6 different 
ways.  That it was a bad winter meant that BC Hydro did poorly in 5 of 6 reliability 
measures which account for nearly half of its quantitative performance measures listed in 
the annual report.  BC Hydro’s safety standards are measured in such a way that one 
incident could result in all executives receiving zero points for safety in their annual 
performance review.  The company prides itself on its intricate safety data and ratings 
system. (Dale Flood, 2009)  Some of BCLCs performance measures are measures of 
public awareness about the corporation’s mandates.  Such targets are more easily 
achieved than more complex targets such as improving employee engagement – an area 
that was difficult for all but BCTC.   
It is important to note that the salary caps are the same for all of these companies 
regardless of the size or importance of the company.  While BCTC is much smaller by 
revenue or assets than BC Hydro, CEO Jane Peverett of BCTC earned only 15% less than 
Hydro CEO Bob Elton.  This inequity of pay for responsibility could lead top CEOs to 
become disheartened and seek work someplace that is more equitable in its method of 
determining pay rates. 
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6: Comparison of BC Hydro with a comparable S&P 500 
company 
6.1  Overview of BC Hydro and Dynegy Holdings Inc. 
BC Hydro earned revenues of CAD$4,855,000,000in the year 2008.  In the same 
year, its Net income was CAD$369,000,000.  BC Hydro’s total Assets for 2008 were 
CAD$13,610,000,000.  As a comparable S&P 500 company, I chose Dynegy Inc.  
Dynegy Inc. is a publicly traded company that sells electricity to key US markets.  
Dynegy reported revenues of USD$3,549,000,000 and Total Assets of 
USD$14,213,000,000.  While slightly larger, than BC Hydro, Dynegy is not as profitable, 
with a net operating income of only $174,000,000.  (BC Hydro, 2008 (a)) (Dynegy Inc, 
2008 (a)) 
Both companies’ are affected strongly by climactic factors as well as economic 
factors that are beyond the control of the CEOs.  One major difference between the two 
companies is that while BC Hydro depends mainly on hydroelectric dams, Dynegy relies 
mainly on natural gas fired plants in order to generate electricity.  BC Hydro is the sole 
power Utility for British Columbia, in effect holding a monopoly on the main market in 
which it operates, however, Dynegy operates in the spot market, supplying electrical 
energy without long term contracts.  This is highly risky for Dynegy and it has no 
guaranteed rate of return on its power generation facilities and projects.  BC Hydro 
enjoys a solid credit rating of AAA from Standard and Poors (Standard and Poors, 2008).  
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Dynegy has a rating of B based on the weak power market conditions during this 
economic downturn. (Standard and Poors, 2009) 
While there are many aspects of running a crown corporation that differ from 
running a publicly traded company, corporations of a similar size will carry a similar 
degree of complexity of operations, and while a crown corporation has no share prices to 
be concerned about, there are other challenges related to the regulatory burden placed on 
Crown Corporations by their government shareholder.  
6.2 CEO Compensation at Dynegy 
In order to determine its pay rates, Dynegy uses a group of six comparators that 
are involved in similar business activities (AES Corp., Allegheny Energy Inc., Edison 
International, Mirant Corporation, NRG Energy Inc. and Reliant Energy Inc.). (Dynegy 
Inc., 2008 (b)) 
Compensation consultant Towers Perrin aggregates the data and combines it with 
information from its 2008 Executive Compensation Database and Long-Term Incentive 
Plan Report and furnishes the committee with information regarding positions with like 
roles and responsibilities to the executives at Dynegy.  The company prohibits Towers 
Perrin from doing any other consulting with Dynegy management without explicit 
approval from the Human Resources Committee.  (Dynegy Inc., 2008 (b)) 
Using the information supplied by Towers Perrin, the committee chase to 
compensate its executives based 72% on long term Incentives, 10% on short term 
incentives, and 18% on base salary.  Its target compensation level is 50
th
 percentile within 
its comparator group.  (Dynegy Inc., 2008 (b)) 
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While Dynegy no longer has employment agreements with its executives 
(previous agreements were allowed to expire and the company now has a policy of not 
signing agreements with its executives) the company took no action against executives 
after an accounting restatement in 2008. 
Short Term Incentives for Dynegy executives are paid in cash, while Long Term 
Incentives are paid in the form of equity incentives that vest three years after their grant 
date.   Equity grants are made by the Human Resources Committee in a meeting near the 
beginning of the year using the closing price of the stock on the day of the meeting as the 
exercise price.  
Because 2008 was a particularly unusual economic environment, many of the 
financial goals that the company set at the beginning of the year were based on 
assumptions that were wrong. The financial performance objectives for 2008 were: 
EBITDAM of $1.1B 
OCF of $635M 
FCF of $300M 
G&A of $175M 
The operational performance objectives for Dynegy executives for 2008 included 
the following areas: 
- Safety 
- Environment 
- Regulatory compliance and advocacy 
- Operational flexibility 
- On time and on budget for construction 
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- Monetization of one or more development projects 
- Broaden scale and scope in key regions and create long term shareholder 
value 
- Highest and best use of capital 
- $200mm in opportunistic asset sales 
- Implementation of trading book structure, controls, metrics and policies 
- On time and budget completion of system implementations 
- Update Records and Information policy and related systems and structures 
- Set up developmental plans for managing directors and above 
- Keep up voluntary turnover at a rate of 6% or less and retain employees rated  
as outstanding and Excellent Contributors 
- Set up training and rotation programs across key areas of the company 
(Dynegy Inc., 2008 (b)) 
The Compensation committee determined that the financial and non- financial 
performance in the year of 2008 merited partial short term incentive payments at a rate of 
55% of maximum.  For CEO Bruce A. Williamson, this amounted to $550,000 
Williamson’s base pay for 2008was $1,000,000 and he received $1,521,032 in stock 
awards and $1,860, 655 in option awards.  Including pension and all other compensation 
(such as perquisites) Williamson received a total of USD$5,430,559 in compensation for 
the year 2008. (Dynegy Inc., 2008 (b)) 
6.3 Comparison of CEO performance at BC Hydro and Dynegy 
Dynegy claims that its anticipated general and administrative costs of 
approximately USD $175 million in 2009 qualify it as having one of the leanest cost 
structures in the sector.  In 2008, Dynegy’s actual General and Administrative costs were 
USD $157 million. (Dynegy Inc, 2008 (a))  Let us compare that number to BC Hydro.  
For 2008, BC hydro had general and administrative costs of CAD$120Million. (BC 
Hydro, 2008 (a))  BC hydro has higher revenues than Dynegy and still manages to keep 
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its General and Administrative expenses lower.  The amount being paid out to the top 
five executives of each company is one place to look in order to find out why these 
companies have such different general and administrative costs.  Below is a chart of the 
different amounts spent on the top five named executive officers for both companies for 
the year2008 
Table 3 Salaries at BC Hydro and Dynegy 
BC Hydro Executive 
Officers 
BC Hydro 
Compensation 
Dynegy Executive 
Officers 
Dynegy 
Compensation 
Elton, BG, CEO CAD$570,897 Bruce A Williamson, 
Chairman, President, 
and CEO 
USD$5,944,358 
VanRuyven, B, Exec 
VP, CC&C 
CAD$426,507 Holli C. Nichols, Exec 
VP and CFO 
USD$1,903,645 
Cowan, Alister, CFO 
(Until April 5 2008 
therefore received no 
incentive for F08) 
CAD$336,949 J. Kevin Blodgett, 
General Counsel and 
Exec VP 
Administration 
USD$1,550,013 
O’Riley, CK, Sr VP, 
EARG 
CAD$371,013 Lynn A. Lednicky, 
Exec VP – Asset 
Management, 
Government and 
Regulatory Affairs 
USD$1,494,825 
Conway, T CEO 
Powerex 
CAD$367,339 Jason Hochberg Exec 
VP – Commercial and 
Market Analytics 
USD$1,983,401 
Total for BC Hydro CAD$2,072,705 Total for Dynegy: USD$13,899,157 
(BC Hydro, 2008 (b))    (Dynegy Inc., 2008 (b)) 
It becomes clear that Dynegy spends more than six times what BC Hydro does for 
the compensation of the top five executives.  If this can be applied to all executive 
salaries across both companies, then it is easy to see why BC Hydro comes out ahead in 
this respect.  So what is Dynegy getting for its money relative to BC Hydro?   
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Both Dynegy and BC Hydro report Comprehensive Income as well as Net 
Income.  Here the differences between the two companies become even more 
pronounced.  BC Hydro’s Comprehensive Income for 2008 was CAD$445,000,000, and 
includes derivative hedging activity on the part of the company. (BC Hydro, 2008 (a))  
Dynegy’s Comprehensive Income for 2008 was in the negatives at USD$(16,000,000). 
(Dynegy Inc, 2008 (a))This loss was mainly the result of mark to market losses, actuarial 
losses and amortization of unrealized prior service costs, and unrealized losses on 
securities and investments.  When it comes to financial manoeuvrings, BC Hydro is 
better able to manage its activities and their results on the income statement. 
Operationally, BC Hydro has the capacity to generate 11,280 Megawatts, 
considerably less than the 17,700 Megawatt generating capacity of Dynegy.  In terms of 
operational revenue, BC Hydro brought in CAD$4,855,000,000, whereas Dynegy made 
only USD$3,549,000,000.  BC Hydro is doing more with less.  Dynegy is just not as 
efficient as BC Hydro when it comes to generating revenues. (BC Hydro, 2008 (a)) 
(Dynegy Inc, 2008 (a)) 
Even without taking BC Hydro’s triple bottom line mandate into account, it is 
already ahead of Dynegy in terms of financial health.  That the CEO of Dynegy earns ten 
times what the CEO of BC Hydro earns is not a measure of any difference in managerial 
talent, but more a difference in the circumstance of the laws governing the compensation 
of the two executives.   
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Conclusion 
Publicly traded companies have vastly different stakeholders and thus 
performance measures will be different.  While there is no magic formula for 
manipulating the behaviour of CEOs to match with stakeholder needs, there are some 
principles that can be applied to all situations, regardless of the type of company being 
managed.   
Corporate governance is the focus of much discussion in Crown Corporations and 
publicly traded companies alike.  The push toward independent directors has been strong 
in both types of companies, and executive compensation has been affected.  In the case of 
Crown Corporations, the legislators issued an actual pay cap, and in the case of SEC 
listed companies, the use of a compensation committee made up of independent directors, 
along with the regulations requiring details of CEO and other Named Executive 
compensation to be published in the proxy report has had the effect of bringing CEO 
salaries back down to earth. 
Transparency of pay is less of an issue for BC Crown Corporations than it is for 
publicly traded companies in the US.  The BC Crown Corporations have to complete a 
simple and specific form for the PSEC that clearly shows what is being paid to which 
executives.  Publicly traded companies in the US are still struggling with the idea of 
simple.  Many of the CD&A documents are confusing to the point of being misleading 
and there is too much open to interpretation with regard to how supplemental pensions 
are recorded.  The hard numbers available from both kinds of companies do give 
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stakeholders useful insight into how efficiently General and Administrative dollars are 
being spent, and this practice of compensation publication could be expanded to more 
positions within the companies.  
Long term and short-term variable pay are excellent ways to motivate CEOs to 
work for the overall success of the company.  In cases where there is some kind of 
economic downturn, however, it is not fair that the CEOs be allowed to switch from 
equity pay to cash pay or from more variable pay to more base pay.  This does not 
motivate anyone to try to mitigate the overall effects of the economy on the business.  
Neither should an upswing in the economy automatically be rewarded with extra variable 
pay as such compensation would reward CEOs without their having done anything to 
earn it.  The pay packages for all CEOs need to take into consideration that everyone in 
the company, executives, workers, board members, shareholders, and other stakeholders, 
must all share in the same successes and losses.  Losses borne by the shareholders should 
be visited upon the other stakeholders, and vice versa.  For too long there were different 
classes of stakeholders in corporations, with the CEO and boards at the top and the 
shareholders and employees at the bottom.  When the money ran short, the bottom 
suffered and the top did not.  Such cases as Home Depot must never be allowed to 
happen again.   
 
Publicly traded companies and Crown corporations are in competition for a 
shrinking talent pool at the upper management levels.  Retention of top executive talent is 
a primary consideration for Human Resources committees of all companies.  In the case 
of BC Crown corporations, they are under strict regulation regarding the maximum 
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allowable compensation of any one person each year. This means that these companies 
have to find innovative ways to compete for talent.  Considering the booming economy 
and shrinking talent pool in the period leading up to the current economic recession, the 
crown corporations have done very well at retaining their top executives.  Crown 
Corporations are forced to accommodate their CEOs in ways that are not damaging to the 
bottom line of the company.  Some of the innovative ways that they can reward CEOs is 
with work-life balance initiatives allowing for time off, executive development to make 
sure that the experience that the CEO gains during his time at the company is fulfilling 
intellectually and has a positive impact on future earning potential, and allowing for 
contact with the people who are shaping the legislation that will affect the whole 
community.  Time spent at a Crown Corporation can allow a CEO to have a chance at 
helping shape the governmental policies of the day. 
The goal for Crown Corporations should be to hire civic-minded individuals who 
believe that working for the public good is a worthwhile pursuit and who also happen to 
be incredibly talented managers.  This means that as well as having a set of personal 
values that is in line with public service, the type of people that are hired on as CEOs 
need to have the best training and highest levels of achievement.  Promoting from within 
is one strategy that seems to work well.  If employees have the opportunity to start their 
career with a company that allows them to develop, take time out for educational leave, 
and even pays for some of that education, they will have incentive to stay, even if the 
company doesn’t pay as much as other companies.  In the case of BC Hydro, they are 
currently exploring a system of grooming employees for eventual senior management 
positions. (Dale Flood, 2009)  Crown corporations should look at all of their young 
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managerial staff as potential future CEOs and raise them up accordingly. There is also a 
better chance of Executives having a deep sense of long term goals if they plan to be with 
the company over the entire tenure of their careers.  There is fear that executives will 
merely use their training as a way to get hired by a private or publicly traded company 
that will pay a higher salary, but this is less likely to be the case over time if the 
employees receive in house opportunities to utilize their training from the beginning.  
Training someone up to do a job and then not allowing them to use that training is very 
de-motivating and must be avoided. 
There are many intrinsic motivators that can be used to motivate all employees, 
and there is no reason that these cannot apply to CEOs as well as those under them.  The 
idea of achieving a personal best in something is one of the most motivating schemes.  
Setting CEO goals high, but not impossibly so, and then regularly checking in with the 
HR committee as to the progress of those goals is very important for helping the CEO 
find his work meaningful and motivating.  Having a real connection between cause and 
effect is also a big motivator.  The CEO has great measures of the effect of his work in 
the pro forma statements that the corporation puts out each quarter, but the more human 
side of his performance may have to be brought to light in other ways.  Some of the more 
qualitative goals may need to be discussed with the HR Committee to really have a full 
understanding of what effect the CEO is having on the company. (Nancy Olewiler, 2009) 
Publicly traded companies could do with stricter regulation when it comes to CEO 
pay.  The current legislation in the US does not provide salary caps, but does provide 
some regulation as to how CEO income must be reported.  The shareholders need more 
protection than this. CEO compensation should be limited to a set percentage of net 
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income.  As well, there should be legislation regarding pay equity in companies so that 
the workers at the bottom cannot be marginalized by an unscrupulous CEO.  If there are 
set levels of pay equity for all levels of employee, then the only way a CEO will be able 
to raise his own compensation is by improving the performance of the company such that 
all employees benefit as well.   
Regulations regarding CEO pay must be written in such a way that they cannot be 
interpreted differently from one company to the next.  The “plain English” clause in SOX 
is quite loosely worded and completely open to interpretation, so much so that it has had 
no effect.  In the case of this rule, it would have been more useful to set out guidelines as 
to document length and grade reading level. 
The reaction to CEO compensation scandals has made lawmakers examine the 
balance of power between executives and shareholders.  Robert A.G. Monks, the founder 
of ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) calls for British style shareholder power.  This 
would require an emergency general meeting at which the board and subsequently the 
CEO could be removed if requested by 10% of shareholders (Monks, 2008).  I think that 
such measures are extreme and should be treated very cautiously.  If a large hedge fund 
or two decided to go after the retained earnings of a company for dividend purposes, this 
could spell disaster for the company in the long term.  In the cases of R&D or asset heavy 
industries, unscrupulous short term profit takers could be tempted toward the same kind 
of corruption that we are trying to prevent in CEOs.  The way that this might be tempered 
is by requiring it to be a consortium of different shareholders (none of them with 
anything approaching minority control of the company) that can call an emergency 
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meeting.  This forced dilution of power will enable further checks and balances so that 
we don’t recreate the problem we are trying to solve. 
Corporate governance at Crown Corporations would seem to be neatly taken care 
of by wise legislation and limits placed on the power of Boards at Crown Corporations.  
The Board Resourcing and Development Office of the government of British Columbia is 
the agency that oversees all of the board appointments for Crown Corporations.  This 
office has guidelines that are laid out in an easy to read document regarding the best 
practices to be followed by crown agencies.  These guidelines include such practices as 
not having the CEO and the board Chair as the same person. (Crown Agencies Secretariat 
• Board Resourcing and Development Office)  In theory, these guidelines are the 
framework that keeps the Boards of Crown Corporations acting in the best interests of the 
shareholders.  This is not necessarily the case if the shareholder we are thinking of is the 
citizenry of the province.  In actual fact, the shareholder that boards and CEOs must 
please first is the Minister responsible.  This is the person who has the power to make 
board and CEO appointments as well as to limit the amount paid to CEOs and boards.  
While the guidelines put in place by the Board Resourcing and Development Office seem 
like they are inviolable, they are only guidelines, and in cases where they are in conflict 
with legislation, then that legislation takes precedence. (Crown Agencies Secretariat • 
Board Resourcing and Development Office)  This means that the government of the day 
is quite capable of enacting legislation to override any corporate governance rules that are 
inconvenient to their ends.  It takes a resolute commitment to good corporate governance 
by the elected officials to make sure that they are not rendering the boards powerless and 
simply governing crown corporations in an autocratic fashion.  In November of 2008, the 
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Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, Richard Neufeld, appointed ex-
Deputy Minister to the Premier, David Emerson to the positions of CEO and Board Chair 
at BC Transmission Corporation. (Morton, 2008)  While Minister Neufeld may have had 
compelling legitimate reasons for doing this, it brings to mind the question of whether or 
not all of the corporate governance guidelines in place in BC’s Crown Corporations are 
just a show for the public or if they have a strong commitment from the Politicians and 
the boards appointed by them.  If there is the perception that the boards are merely 
ornamental and that the real power over Crown Corporations lies within the legislature, 
then the public may come to resent any salaries paid to those in charge at Crown 
Corporations and there could be a backlash against these companies.  Such a backlash 
could result in their eventual privatization or elimination, which would be a great loss to 
the people of British Columbia. 
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